Delivered as part of ‘Symposium’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Symposium’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Regulation of markets and networks in the UK: the state of play in a period of economic and political insecurity’, Annual Westminster Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Regulation of markets and networks in the UK: the state of play in a period of economic and political insecurity’, Annual Westminster Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Regulation of markets and networks in the UK: the state of play in a period of economic and political insecurity’, Annual Westminster Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Regulation of markets and networks in the UK: the state of play in a period of economic and political insecurity’, Annual Westminster Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Regulation of markets and networks in the UK: the state of play in a period of economic and political insecurity’, Annual Westminster Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Regulation of markets and networks in the UK: the state of play in a period of economic and political insecurity’, Annual Westminster Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Regulation of markets and networks in the UK: the state of play in a period of economic and political insecurity’, Annual Westminster Conference 2015
The word market is widely used in contemporary economic and political discourse, but usually without any clear sense of what it means or is meant to refer to. In a literal sense, people do not know what they are talking about. The first part of the essay therefore examines the question: what is a market?
The answer is that a market is an economic institution, i.e. a set/system of rules that structures, regulates or governs a particular set of activities involving exchange of goods and services. It encompasses both the system of rules and the activities governed by them and it serves a specific, particular purpose or function, which is to reduce the costs of exchange transactions
This paper considers the banking system from the respective points of view of EU monetary and competition policy, and the issues that arise when excess credit creates an asset price bubble and crash. Banks are subject to competitive pressures, but are interdependent to a higher degree than most firms. Potential competition policy responses to this combination of features could include monitoring by the monetary and competition authorities to see if a concerted practice is involved where there is excessive bank lending; making co-ordinated behaviour between competing banks subject to the normal competition law requirement that it should provide economic benefits in the real economy, and to consumers; and, if it is established that an asset price bubble and crash has resulted from a concerted practice, adjusting the overhang of debt down to the pre-bubble value of the asset.
The Office of Fair Trading’s (OFT) 14 March 2014 report on higher education found that England’s higher education sector is largely “working well”, but it scratched at the surface of the problems that are facing the higher education market.
The OFT launched a call for evidence in October 2013 to examine whether students are able to make informed choices as a driver for competition in higher education; whether students are treated fairly; whether there was any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour between higher education institutions; and whether the regulatory environment protects students and facilitates entry, innovation and managed exit by higher education institutions.
In his thought provoking note Applying behavioural economics at the Regulatory Conduct
Authority, 2 Stephen Littlechild has drawn attention to an important set of questions about the
use of behavioural economics in regulation. The Regulatory Conduct Authority of the paper’s
title is an imaginary agency that made a brief, Brigadoon-like appearance on 1 April 2014. Its
hypothetical purpose is to make use of behavioural economics in regulating other regulators.
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
At the 2013 Beesley Lecture on climate change policy, David Kennedy, Chief Executive of
the Climate Change Commission (CCC), discussed the role of the Commission in providing
support for promising but not-yet-economic technologies. The last CCC budget report identified these technologies as: wind power (especially off-shore wind), tidal range, geothermal, solar and potentially CCS (carbon capture and storage). As described by David Kennedy, current CCC and government policy is to provide support for
these technologies until they can float off into commercial operation without government
support. But, what happens if they don’t successfully graduate? Who will pull the plug? When,
how and on what basis?
This essay is focused on ways in which complexity in economic systems is addressed in policymaking and in particular on the over-simplifications that frequently occur in assessments. In doing so it touches on a range of matters that are relevant to the central concern. These include the monopolistic nature of public decision making and the limitations that this entails, the tendency for private interests to achieve undue influence in the use of this market power, the induced subservience of economic reasoning to these interests (corrupted economics), and the institutional disorder that can be created as a result.
It is organised around three questions: Are there reasons to expect a systematic policymaking bias against giving due consideration to complexities and uncertainties in the evolution of economic systems? Does any such systematic bias matter much? If it does matter, can anything be done to improve policymaking performance?
The Customer Forum was set up in September 2011 with three aims: to work with Scottish Water on a programme of customer research; in the light of this to understand and represent customer priorities to Scottish Water and to the Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS); and to seek to secure the most appropriate outcome for customers in the Strategic Review of Charges. In October 2012 the Forum was additionally asked to seek to agree a Business Plan with Scottish Water, consistent with Ministerial Objectives and with guidance notes that WICS would provide.