Delivered as part of ‘The discovery, assessment and use of evidence in regulatory and competition law decision making’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2018
Delivered as part of ‘Too busy to think’, Annual Westminster Conference 2017
Delivered as part of ‘The evolution of UK regulatory policy in retrospect: What has worked well? What hasn’t? What can be learned from experience?’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2016
Mapping the boundary between consumer protection policy and competition policy: when does consumer protection become anti-competitive
Delivered as part of ‘Symposium’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2015
This paper considers the banking system from the respective points of view of EU monetary and competition policy, and the issues that arise when excess credit creates an asset price bubble and crash. Banks are subject to competitive pressures, but are interdependent to a higher degree than most firms. Potential competition policy responses to this combination of features could include monitoring by the monetary and competition authorities to see if a concerted practice is involved where there is excessive bank lending; making co-ordinated behaviour between competing banks subject to the normal competition law requirement that it should provide economic benefits in the real economy, and to consumers; and, if it is established that an asset price bubble and crash has resulted from a concerted practice, adjusting the overhang of debt down to the pre-bubble value of the asset.
Beesley Lecture series XX