
Commercial Society and its Internal Enemies – A Smithian Synopsis
In this new piece in our Past Learnings Series, George Yarrow discusses the publicly perceived “untrustworthiness” of politicians
In this new piece in our Past Learnings Series, George Yarrow discusses the publicly perceived “untrustworthiness” of politicians
The notion that promoting competition is a Good Thing has become a consistent theme in economic policymaking in recent decades, accompanied by an implication that “the more of it the better” should be a presumptive policy stance. In contrast, very many members of the public appear to find these propositions far from obvious, not least those who are owners of, or workers for, business enterprises.
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (“WoN”) is a foundational book in the social sciences and one of the classic works of human civilization, but like many classics it is rarely read. Its influence has been profound, but that influence has come largely via the work of Smith’s
successors who, in their own writings, have frequently cherry picked the text in ways that have
served their own, particular purposes in a range of different, later contexts. In consequence many of Smith’s own points have been lost or distorted…
As the Brexit negotiations begin to focus on future trading and customs arrangements these
notes reprise the principal theme of Brexit and the Single Market2 (published in July 2016 in
the wake of the referendum) and add comments on some aspects of the subsequent discourse.
Very briefly, my conclusion back then was that the most efficacious way to respond to the
Leave vote on 23 June 2016 would be to seek a Brexit based on the UK’s continued
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) in the period immediately following
withdrawal from the Treaty of Lisbon. There were three main reasons for taking this view.
Delivered as part of ‘In a period of great disturbance and volatility’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2017
This essay is a developed version of the Zeeman Lecture given at the Regulatory Policy Institute’s Annual Conference on 26 September 2017 at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University. The motivation for the Lecture was that, in the period since the Brexit Referendum on 23 June 2016, politicians, interest groups, journalists and commentators have fed the public a steady diet of alternative facts and false or misleading propositions. The Lecture focused on three of a much wider set of such assertions and propositions. All are relevant to the future conduct of regulatory policy, though each in different ways. Each is associated with a cognitive style that I have called convenient, selective myopia.
Our aim in this paper is to explain and comment on some of the principal features and implications of the European Economic Area Agreement (EEAA). A number of misunderstandings about the content and operation of the Agreement appear to have made their way into public discourse in the UK. We are concerned about the distorting effect of these, not only on public perceptions, but also potentially on the Government’s position. Our hope is that this paper may help inform a more considered debate about the UK’s Brexit destination.
The word market is widely used in contemporary economic and political discourse, but usually without any clear sense of what it means or is meant to refer to. In a literal sense, people do not know what they are talking about. The first part of the essay therefore examines the question: what is a market?
The answer is that a market is an economic institution, i.e. a set/system of rules that structures, regulates or governs a particular set of activities involving exchange of goods and services. It encompasses both the system of rules and the activities governed by them and it serves a specific, particular purpose or function, which is to reduce the costs of exchange transactions
This essay is focused on ways in which complexity in economic systems is addressed in policymaking and in particular on the over-simplifications that frequently occur in assessments. In doing so it touches on a range of matters that are relevant to the central concern. These include the monopolistic nature of public decision making and the limitations that this entails, the tendency for private interests to achieve undue influence in the use of this market power, the induced subservience of economic reasoning to these interests (corrupted economics), and the institutional disorder that can be created as a result.
It is organised around three questions: Are there reasons to expect a systematic policymaking bias against giving due consideration to complexities and uncertainties in the evolution of economic systems? Does any such systematic bias matter much? If it does matter, can anything be done to improve policymaking performance?
Delivered as part of ‘The role of competition in public policy’, Annual Westminster Conference 2010