Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
At the 2013 Beesley Lecture on climate change policy, David Kennedy, Chief Executive of
the Climate Change Commission (CCC), discussed the role of the Commission in providing
support for promising but not-yet-economic technologies. The last CCC budget report identified these technologies as: wind power (especially off-shore wind), tidal range, geothermal, solar and potentially CCS (carbon capture and storage). As described by David Kennedy, current CCC and government policy is to provide support for
these technologies until they can float off into commercial operation without government
support. But, what happens if they don’t successfully graduate? Who will pull the plug? When,
how and on what basis?
This essay is focused on ways in which complexity in economic systems is addressed in policymaking and in particular on the over-simplifications that frequently occur in assessments. In doing so it touches on a range of matters that are relevant to the central concern. These include the monopolistic nature of public decision making and the limitations that this entails, the tendency for private interests to achieve undue influence in the use of this market power, the induced subservience of economic reasoning to these interests (corrupted economics), and the institutional disorder that can be created as a result.
It is organised around three questions: Are there reasons to expect a systematic policymaking bias against giving due consideration to complexities and uncertainties in the evolution of economic systems? Does any such systematic bias matter much? If it does matter, can anything be done to improve policymaking performance?
The Customer Forum was set up in September 2011 with three aims: to work with Scottish Water on a programme of customer research; in the light of this to understand and represent customer priorities to Scottish Water and to the Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS); and to seek to secure the most appropriate outcome for customers in the Strategic Review of Charges. In October 2012 the Forum was additionally asked to seek to agree a Business Plan with Scottish Water, consistent with Ministerial Objectives and with guidance notes that WICS would provide.
Ofgem, OFT and CMA are presently carrying out “an assessment of how well competition in the markets for gas and electricity is serving the interests of households and small firms in Great Britain”. They intend to publish a first assessment by the end of March 2014. The outcome of Ofgem’s consumer research will follow in late spring. Ofgem, OFT and CMA will then each consider their next steps. All options remain open, including a market investigation reference.
Entry, exit and firm restructuring are important aspects of the ability of any market to respond and adapt to changing circumstances. The capacity to respond and adapt relatively quickly – often referred to as flexibility – is important for the effective performance of a market, particularly in periods of substantial change.
The study is concerned chiefly with barriers to entry, exit and ‘mobility’ (which includes business restructuring such as a merger) that may be caused or exacerbated by regulatory requirements, with particular reference to the barriers facing small solicitors’ practices
The Regulatory Policy Institute was commissioned by the Legal Services Board (LSB), supported by the Law Society, to undertake a study of possible barriers to (a) entry, (b) exit, and (c) changes in the business structures of regulated solicitors’ firms/practices in England and Wales; and the findings of this study are set out in what follows. The focus of the work is, as was requested, on small solicitors’ practices, with particular attention given to the consideration of barriers to change that might either be caused or exacerbated by current regulatory arrangements, or that might be amenable to reduction via modification of those arrangements.
The extent to which firms face price-elastic demands for their products is important in the application of competition law and in judgments made as to whether they have significant market power. In the context of the airport industry1, assessing price-elasticities is complicated by the fact that one major type of consumer of airport services, the air passenger, is not charged directly for use of terminals and airside infrastructure2. Instead, the airport derives its revenues from charges to airlines and from the supply of non-aeronautical services. The charges to airlines then become one of many input costs that the airlines recoup from passenger fares, and this intermediation has significant implications for the demand analysis.