Network Governance in a Changing World – Energy
Delivered as part of ‘Issues in market and regulatory governance’, Annual Westminster Conference 2016
Delivered as part of ‘Issues in market and regulatory governance’, Annual Westminster Conference 2016
Delivered as part of ‘Symposium’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2015
Delivered as part of ‘Coherence and stability in regulatory practice’, Annual Westminster Conference 2014
At the 2013 Beesley Lecture on climate change policy, David Kennedy, Chief Executive of
the Climate Change Commission (CCC), discussed the role of the Commission in providing
support for promising but not-yet-economic technologies. The last CCC budget report identified these technologies as: wind power (especially off-shore wind), tidal range, geothermal, solar and potentially CCS (carbon capture and storage). As described by David Kennedy, current CCC and government policy is to provide support for
these technologies until they can float off into commercial operation without government
support. But, what happens if they don’t successfully graduate? Who will pull the plug? When,
how and on what basis?
Ofgem, OFT and CMA are presently carrying out “an assessment of how well competition in the markets for gas and electricity is serving the interests of households and small firms in Great Britain”. They intend to publish a first assessment by the end of March 2014. The outcome of Ofgem’s consumer research will follow in late spring. Ofgem, OFT and CMA will then each consider their next steps. All options remain open, including a market investigation reference.
At the final Beesley lecture of this year’s series, on reducing the costs of lowering carbon emissions, an old chestnut of an economic argument was raised, to the effect that UK shale gas production, even if it starts to happen in the relatively near future, “will not affect UK prices for many years to come because it will not be marginal supply for a long time yet.”
The context here is an interesting one: the main thesis of the lecture was that current policies of providing subsidies to favoured technologies had foreclosing or excluding effect on alternative approaches to decarbonisation, and that part of the exclusionary effect occurred by way of attempts to prevent the development of lines of analysis and reasoning that threatened the privileged policy narratives.
In 2012, supported by a secretariat at the Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and
Tourism and by Dr Chris Decker, then of the Regulatory Policy Institute, Oxford, we conducted a
review for the Australian federal and state governments of the Limited Merits Review regime (the
“LMR”) in Australia for appeals of energy network decisions made by the relevant regulator. The
LMR regime had been introduced in 2008 with an intention to streamline appeals procedures. Our
Review extended over a six month period and was based upon: written submissions, mostly in
response to two ‘Issues Papers’ (consultation documents) that we published; an extensive series of
meetings we held with interested parties, including consumer representative bodies, companies,
regulators and government departments; detailed analysis of the substance of the individual cases
that had passed through the new system; a study of appeals systems in overseas jurisdictions; and a
study of the role and scope of Australian administrative tribunals in reviewing other types of
administrative decisions ‘on the merits’ . In consequence, we collected a considerable body of
evidence.
The Energy Bill, currently on its passage through Parliament following its inclusion in the Queen’s Speech, proposes a number of important changes to the UK energy market. Although the Bill contains several elements, its focus, notwithstanding its title, is on electricity rather than on other parts of the energy market. Within this narrower purview, electricity market reform (EMR) takes centre stage. In its introduction to this part of the Bill the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) explains that the reforms are being put in place to attract £110 billion of investment which it claims is needed to replace generating capacity and upgrade the grid. Two key elements of EMR are the introduction of a system of contracts to support new nuclear and other lower carbon generation (the so-called contracts for differences, CfDs) and the development of a ‘Capacity Market’.2 It is with this latter element, the Capacity Market, that this paper is concerned.
Delivered as part of ‘The future of independent regulation’, Annual Westminster Conference 2013
A presentation to the Palanza Seminar, 4-6 October 2012, Sestri, Levante.