In this paper, Daniel Pryor argues that competition interventions in digital markets have often been premised on faulty economic assumptions and therefore led to various unintended consequences
Should we establish ex ante economic regulation of ‘digital platforms’, with or without ‘enhanced’ competition law – and what form should any regulatory structures take? This question is a pressing priority for policymakers and competition authorities in many jurisdictions, including the UK and across the EU. We can all see the extent to which services offered by digital platforms (large and small, generalised and highly specialised) now mediate most distanced interactions between people and/or organisations, whether it is economic, in civil society or in our private lives.
The aim of this work is to foster contributions to the policy debate concerning the economic regulation of digital platforms. The anticipated focus is on economic regulation specifically, meaning ex ante rules designed to rectify market failures or abuses rather than, for example, regulation of online content or political speech). However, it may be that some areas of research necessarily involve ‘cross-over’ questions between economic and non-economic regulatory issues.
Delivered as part of ‘Investing in utility networks with less reliance on markets and more uncertainty: how do we deliver security and efficiency?’, Hertford Seminar in Regulation 2019
“Digital Revolution”, “Disruptive Innovation”
and Conduct Assessment:
New Insights Needed for Enforcement?
Thoughts on platforms, foreclosure, and algorithmic collusion
RPI Annual Competition and Regulation Conference
26-27 September 2017
Delivered as part of ‘In a period of great disturbance and volatility’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2017
Delivered as part of ‘In a period of great disturbance and volatility’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2017
Delivered as part of ‘In a period of great disturbance and volatility’, Annual Competition and Regulation Conference 2017