
The electricity and telecommunications sectors in Spain: Rapid change, regulators at the crossroads
This study highlights limits to real reform in the electricity and telecommunications sectors in Spain

This study highlights limits to real reform in the electricity and telecommunications sectors in Spain

This is an introduction to a book (edited by Claude Henry, Michel Matheu and Alain Jeunemaitre and published by OUP 2001) assessing new forms of public regulation in Europe and indicating what has already been learned and suggesting the questions that need to be addressed.

This paper addresses the questions of how and why do European energy regulators co-operate.It is divided into five sections: a description of the legal framewrorks and market structures of electricity and natural gas in the EU; why energy regulators have been introduced by most Member States and why different institutional formats have been adopted; why co-operation among energy regulators is necessary; the main objectives of the Council of European Energy Regulators; the role of regulators within the political and institutional framework of the EU.

Developments in the principles of utility regulation are assessed in the light of UK experience. The incentives-rent extraction model of price regulation, multi-product pricing and access pricing, rules for spot markets, structural regulation and the problem of regulatory commitment are discussed using a unified theoretical framework.

An overview of the recent liberalisation of the telecommunications, electricity, and railways sectors in Germany.

This is a draft of chapter 8 of book, ‘Regulation of Network Utilities’ (edited by Claude Henry, Michel Matheu and Alain Jeunemaitre and published by OUP 2001) assessing new forms of public regulation in Europe

This brief note responds to the MoJ’s call for evidence in the context of its review of legal
services regulation. It is based on past and current work of the Regulatory Policy Institute in
both the legal services sector and more generally across sectors of the UK economy and
internationally. It focuses on general principles rather than on specific detail.

The Regulatory Policy Institute’s Better Government Programme was established to focus on practical proposals for improving accountability and transparency in UK and EU policy and regulatory processes. Consideration of political risk – uncertainty arising from actions or the structure of policy or regulatory processes – falls naturally within that remit and is topical at a time when considerable attention is being paid to risk assessment and management as an integral part of directors’ and financiers’ duties.
The Risk Commission was originally assembled under the aegis of the Social Market Foundation. The work was subsequrntly transferred to the RPI

Consideration of political risk – uncertainty arising from actions or the structure of policy or regulatory processes – is topical at a time when considerable attention is being paid to risk assessment and management as an integral part of directors’ and financiers’ duties. The RPI assembled a group of politicians, former officials and Special Advisers, and corporate and City specialists to work with us in assessing the evidence.

Speech to the Hertford Seminar in Regulation, ‘New challenges in competition policy’

Regulatory risk is a controversial topic. Firstly, does the presence of an industry regulator create regulatory risk, and, secondly, if regulatory risk does exist, should investors be compensated in the form of extra return? This study investigates these issues for UK regulated businesses, and, importantly, it also investigates whether the notion of regulatory risk should be widened to include the actions of one industry regulator imparting risk upon the whole regulatory sector. Capital market data is collected in connection with an announcement concerning a possible change in the regulatory regime for elctricity companies. We find substantial evidence of a consistent market reaction to the announcement acroos the electricity and water industries, with less compleeing evidence for other regulated companies. The market reaction is not explained as an adjustment for systematic risk. Therefore the conclusions from this evidence are that regulatory risk is present, that this risk may not be confined to an industry, and it is risk that does not require compensation in the form of additional return – it is unsystemic risk.

Between July 1995 and January 1996 a series of one-to-one reviews were carried out with all the regulatory bodies, seven investment analysts, five companies each in the electricity and water industries, British Gas (BG), British Telecom (BT and British Airports Authority (BAA). Issues focused on the sources and nature of risk, the cost of capital and other pressing concerns of interviewees. This document provides a summary of the views expressed.

A personal perspective on the regulatory relationships, their workings, and their effects on the way business operates, including: remarks of a somewhat theoretical kind about the nature of regulation in a free market economy; an examination of the way in which ideas on what regulation is about have been incorporated into the regime for telecommunications and how these ideas have actually worked in practice; and some proposals for reform

It could be argued that 35 years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, European competition policy is on the verge of fulfilling its

From time to time UK governments and their agencies have been concerned about the level of competion in the beer market, and, in particular, whether competition is sufficiently effective to ensure that, given the government tax take, prices are kept low in relation to costs.

The costs and effectiveness of two CO2 emission control policies in Japan

This study examines perspectives of different generating systems (nuclear, LNG, coal, oil, thermal power) in economic terms by extimating their generating costs at the plants commissioned in fiscal 1992 and those in fiscal 2000 from current and likely levels of unit construction cost, fuel price and other conditions.

Environmental regulation is defined as regulation undertaken to protect environmental standards. The precise objectives are, however, frequently far less clear, sometimes even to the regulator. Definition of precise objecives of the regulation is a crucial first step.

This paper integrates a simple model of the global economy with a model of the global climate in order to calculate the associated evolution of global warming over the very long term. It includes both a brief non technical overview of the model and a detailed description of the model.

Energy prices are a much favoured target of public policy, subject to price controls in franchised monopoly markets, with a levy applied to electricity generated from fossil-fuel generating sets passed over to the operators of nuclear power stations.

The paper starts with a reinterpretation of the debate between Janos Kornai and Stanislaw Gomulka on causes of shortages in the Soviet-type economies (STEs). The paper discusses both economic and political aspects of control of firms’ finances and shows that the solution of the agency problem by regulation alone must lead to very disappointing results.

The aim of this paper is to examine how the completion of the single market, subsidiarity, and transparency and efficiency have influenced the major changes to the Commission’s competition policy that have taken place over the last few years, and in particular in 1992.

This paper sets out results from work in progress on the issue of tariff structures for access to, and use of, network facilities. Starting from a simple version of the notional path approach, it is argued that it is relatively straightforward to extend the method so as to incorporate genuine network features into the resulting tariff structures. The resulting approach is called least-cost notional flow analysis. The generalisation leads naturally to a tariff structure based on entry and exit charges. It also offers a framework in which conflicting objectives – such as cost reflectivitiy, cost recovery, spatial averaging of prices, ease of monitoring, etc. — can be traded-off in a relatively transparent way.

Three papers based upon presentations at a seminar held at Hertford College, Oxford in February 1992. The presentations were intended to offer rather different perspectives on gas regulation.