This is an introduction to a book (edited by Claude Henry, Michel Matheu and Alain Jeunemaitre and published by OUP 2001) assessing new forms of public regulation in Europe and indicating what has already been learned and suggesting the questions that need to be addressed.
This paper addresses the questions of how and why do European energy regulators co-operate.It is divided into five sections: a description of the legal framewrorks and market structures of electricity and natural gas in the EU; why energy regulators have been introduced by most Member States and why different institutional formats have been adopted; why co-operation among energy regulators is necessary; the main objectives of the Council of European Energy Regulators; the role of regulators within the political and institutional framework of the EU.
Developments in the principles of utility regulation are assessed in the light of UK experience. The incentives-rent extraction model of price regulation, multi-product pricing and access pricing, rules for spot markets, structural regulation and the problem of regulatory commitment are discussed using a unified theoretical framework.
An overview of the recent liberalisation of the telecommunications, electricity, and railways sectors in Germany.
This is a draft of chapter 8 of book, ‘Regulation of Network Utilities’ (edited by Claude Henry, Michel Matheu and Alain Jeunemaitre and published by OUP 2001) assessing new forms of public regulation in Europe
Regulatory risk is a controversial topic. Firstly, does the presence of an industry regulator create regulatory risk, and, secondly, if regulatory risk does exist, should investors be compensated in the form of extra return? This study investigates these issues for UK regulated businesses, and, importantly, it also investigates whether the notion of regulatory risk should be widened to include the actions of one industry regulator imparting risk upon the whole regulatory sector. Capital market data is collected in connection with an announcement concerning a possible change in the regulatory regime for elctricity companies. We find substantial evidence of a consistent market reaction to the announcement acroos the electricity and water industries, with less compleeing evidence for other regulated companies. The market reaction is not explained as an adjustment for systematic risk. Therefore the conclusions from this evidence are that regulatory risk is present, that this risk may not be confined to an industry, and it is risk that does not require compensation in the form of additional return – it is unsystemic risk.
Between July 1995 and January 1996 a series of one-to-one reviews were carried out with all the regulatory bodies, seven investment analysts, five companies each in the electricity and water industries, British Gas (BG), British Telecom (BT and British Airports Authority (BAA). Issues focused on the sources and nature of risk, the cost of capital and other pressing concerns of interviewees. This document provides a summary of the views expressed.
The costs and effectiveness of two CO2 emission control policies in Japan
This study examines perspectives of different generating systems (nuclear, LNG, coal, oil, thermal power) in economic terms by extimating their generating costs at the plants commissioned in fiscal 1992 and those in fiscal 2000 from current and likely levels of unit construction cost, fuel price and other conditions.
Environmental regulation is defined as regulation undertaken to protect environmental standards. The precise objectives are, however, frequently far less clear, sometimes even to the regulator. Definition of precise objecives of the regulation is a crucial first step.