The History of Astronomy (HoA) was an early work of Adam Smith’s, but it remained unpublished in his own lifetime and has subsequently received far less attention from scholars than the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and the Wealth of Nations (WoN). It is, however, foundational for understanding his modes of thought in developing those later, more famous books.
The original, full title of HoA was “An Inquiry into the Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the History of Astronomy”, and this offers a better prospectus for its content than the abbreviated title in use today. It is primarily concerned with what today is labelled the ‘philosophy of science’, using the development of thinking about the motions of the celestial bodies as an illustration or case study.
It is a long essay/book, divided into four sections. The fourth and longest, which dominates the others in terms of textual length, is indeed an account of the history of astronomy, chosen as the case study for a reason set out in the first paragraph of that section: “Of all the phaenomena of nature, the celestial appearances are, by their greatness and beauty, the most universal objects of the curiosity of mankind.”
There follows an account of the relevant history of human thinking that starts with primitive, mythological accounts of celestial phenomena, followed by the Greeks (Eudoxus, Aristotle, Ptolemy), then Copernicus, Keppler and Brahe, and ending at the (then) apex of development with Newton.
Sections 1-3 of the HoA are, though, the focal point of interest, and the work opens with a stunning first paragraph, the rhetorical technique that would later be deployed in both the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations:
“Wonder, Surprise, and Admiration, are words which, though often confounded, denote, in our language, sentiments that are indeed allied, but that are in some respects different also, and distinct from one another. What is new and singular, excites that sentiment which, in strict propriety, is called Wonder; what is unexpected, Surprise; and what is great or beautiful, Admiration.”
Wonder, surprise and admiration (encompassing beauty) — three sentiments, three feelings or emotions about things – were aspects of human nature, the study of which was a major preoccupation of the Scottish literati of the time. The bridge from these three sentiments to the different set of moral sentiments examined in TMS is short and direct: in both cases Smith’s effort is devoted chiefly to studying the ways in which the sentiments contribute to forming the actual (rather than hypothetical) human judgments. The approach contrasts with moral and scientific philosophies that take their standpoint from abstract principles, divorced from everyday experience.
Smith expands on the roles played by the sentiments in driving scientific progress as follows:
“Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of nature. Nature, after the largest experience that common observation can acquire, seems to abound with events which appear solitary and incoherent with all that go before them, which therefore disturb the easy movement of the imagination; which makes its ideas succeed each other, if one may say so, by irregular starts and sallies; and which thus tend, in some measure, to introduce those confusions and distractions we formerly mentioned. Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavors to introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the great revolutions of the universe, to that tone of tranquility and composure, which is both the most agreeable in itself, and most suitable to its nature.”
Thus, we are introduced to the notions of the connecting principles of nature (the object of scientific study) and the invisible connecting chains that “bind together” what otherwise would be experienced as disjointed phenomena. The philosopher/scientist seeks to “represent” the connecting chains in the human mind, and to do this requires that they be discovered by (imagined in) the mind. Prior to that discovery/imagination they remain ‘unseen’ (‘invisible’) to the observer, unrepresented in the mind.
As stated, these views are foundational for all Smith’s later work, which culminated in the WoN. In the latter, his agenda was to render the connecting principles and connecting chains of economic life ‘visible’, in the sense of being represented in the mind. In effect, he says to his readers. ‘Look, in this context there are unseen connectivities that, until represented in the human mind, can only seem to be the work of ‘invisible hands’. Let me try to help you to see them, to represent them in your minds, as Newton did in the field of astronomy.’
For Smith himself, the end product of a particular stage in an ever-continuing discovery process was tranquility and composure (‘peace’) of mind, but this particular feeling can be generalised to other sentiments, as is revealed in the autobiographies of later, great scientists. For example:
Einstein: [Conception of the Equivalence Principle was] “the happiest thought of my life.”
Heisenberg: I “could no longer doubt the mathematical consistency and coherence of the kind of quantum mechanics to which my calculations pointed. At first, I was deeply alarmed. I had the feeling that, through the surface of atomic phenomena, I was looking at a strangely beautiful interior, and felt almost giddy at the thought that I now had to probe this wealth of mathematical structures nature had so generously spread out before me.”
Dirac: “This result is too beautiful to be false; it is more important to have beauty in one’s equations than to have them fit experiment” [1].
In summary: Discordance between existing representations in the mind (‘prior beliefs’) and observational data causes a sense of dissatisfaction for scientists, though not all people feel it to the same degree as great scientists [2]: the human brain has tricks it can play by shutting out consideration of parts of observational experience, both individually (e.g. confirmation bias), and socially (e.g. attachment to a mutual support group governed by a collective delusion). The discordance between prior beliefs and observational evidence triggers a search to alleviate the dissatisfaction, by discovering hitherto ‘unseen’ connections among observations. And when significant breakthroughs are made, (mostly positive) feelings are triggered.
As for the notion of truth in this philosophy of science, it could be said that it refers simply to the best available representation of the connecting principles of nature that is evidenced at any given time. It is always provisional in nature, susceptible to further development.
[1] We believe that Dirac was writing about his first encounter with Schrödinger’s wave equation, for which no supporting evidence was available at the time. Much later in life, he elaborated on his thinking as follows: “It seems that if one is working from the point of view of getting beauty in one’s equations, and if one has really a sound insight, one is on a sure line of progress. If there is not complete agreement between the results of one’s work and experiment, one should not allow oneself to be too discouraged, because the discrepancy may well be due to minor features that are not properly taken into account and that will get cleared up with further development of the theory.”
So, it is not that the fit between theory and evidence is to be downgraded as a criterion of scientific success, but rather that the appearance of beauty is a signifier both of progress achieved and of prospective progress ahead.
The ‘progressive’ nature of scientific discovery is, we think, very much in accord with Smith’s views, particularly in the WoN. No absolutist view of truth is engaged, as the younger Dirac showed in immediately developing Schrödinger’s equation so as to be consistent with Einstein’s relativity (it wasn’t in its original form), a development that in turn led to the introduction of the concept of anti-matter into the minds of physicists. And evidence corroborating these early developments in quantum mechanics subsequently accumulated very quickly. Dirac and Schrödinger shared the 1933 Nobel Prize in physics, a year later than Heisenberg’s award (1932).
[2] Smith foreshadows his later development of the significance of the division of labour in the WoN by noting that philosophers/scientists who spend their whole working lives studying the connecting principles of nature are likely to feel discordances between observations and their existing mental maps of things in a particularly intense way.